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Hazardous air pollutants are regulated under Title IlIl of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The Amendments replace the risk-based approach
mandated in the 1977 Amendments with a prescriptive, technology-based approach requiring that maximum achievable control technology (MACT)
be applied to all major industrial sources of 189 hazardous air pollutants. The change reflects political, rather than scientific consensus that the public
health benefits justify the costs. The choice is put into perspective by looking at the interface between science and policy that occurs as part of reg-
ular decisionmaking. Particular emphasis is given to examining the interrelationships among facts (science), judgments (science policy), and policy
(values) in the context of the risk assessment paradigm. Science and policy are discussed in relation to Title l1l, contrasting the political consensus
for action with the scientific uncertainty about risks and benefits. It is argued that a balanced research program is needed to get the facts right about
hazardous air pollutants, including research to meet statutory requirements, to reduce uncertainties in risk assessment, and to address strategic
issues. - Environ Health Perspect 103(Suppl 6):213-222 (1995)
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Introduction
In the United States, there is a longstand-
ing societal commitment to safeguarding
people's health from the adverse effects of
toxic agents in the environment. This is
reflected in the missions, mandates, and
actions of federal regulatory agencies like
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(U.S. EPA), U.S. Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA), U.S. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), and
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC). At the state level, there are
also numerous regulatory agencies that
share responsibilities for regulating risks
from toxic exposures. Regulatory decision
making is defined here to mean the kinds
ofdecisions that these regulatory agencies
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must make to balance trade-offs between
economic and societal costs ofgovernment
intervention on one hand and correspond-
ing benefits to public health or environ-
mental quality on the other.
This article looks at how science is used
in making regulatory decisions and exam-
ines Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments as a case study. The discus-
sion is divided into two major sections: a
general survey of regulatory decision mak-
ing with emphasis on the role of science
and an examination of the hazardous air
pollutant provisions ofthe Clean AirAct.
Survey of Regulatory
Decision Making
It is useful, at the outset, to examine the
conceptual framework for regulatory deci-
sions, keeping in mind that practical reali-
ties often intervene to make real-world
decisions more complicated and harder to
analyze.
SciencePolicy: TheInterface
between ScienceandPolicy
In the process of regulatory decision mak-
ing, there is a direct interface between sci-
ence and policy. Science is used here in its
broadest sense to encompass research and
development, technical and research sup-
port, monitoring and data collection, review
and interpretation of technical investiga-
tions, and assessments ofhealth and envi-
ronmental risks. Policy is used to mean
decisions both about the acceptability of
risks and about the tradeoffs between the
costs and benefits of intervention to pre-
vent and reduce unacceptable risks. The
interface between science and policy has
been called science policy, and in the con-
text of regulatory decision making, it has
two complementary meanings (1,2): the
use of science to make judgments about
the formulation and implementation of
policy (e.g., quantitative risk assessment),
and the development ofpolicy specifically
for science (e.g., setting priorities for
research directions and funding).
As depicted in Figure 1, science and
policy can be conceptualized as existing on
opposite ends of a fact-value continuum.
Science is portrayed as primarily factual,
with a smaller but important value compo-
nent, while policy is comprised primarily
ofvalues, with a smaller but important fac-
tual component. Science policy exists at
the intersection between facts and values,
often functioning in the area where sci-
entific knowledge and understanding are
incomplete. This means that judgments,
inferences, and extrapolations are a neces-
sary aspect of most, if not all, science pol-
icy decisions.
Relationships amongResearch, Risk
Assessment, andRiskManagement
According to the National Research Council
(3,4) and the Office of Technology
Assessment (5), regulatory decision making
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework forthe interrelationships between science,
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can be thought of as occurring in three
phases: a) research to provide necessary sci-
entific information and understanding;
b) risk assessment, either qualitative or
quantitative, to estimate the likelihood,
magnitude, and uncertainty ofrisks; and c)
risk management to make determinations
about the risks that are unacceptable and
what, if anything, to do about them. A
fourth element, risk communication, is
becoming increasingly important, and refers
to the need for regulatory agencies to enter
into a dialogue with stakeholders to explain
risks and risk-related actions, and to respond
to their concerns andquestions (6).
In a landmark 1983 report, Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process, the National
Research Council (NRC) argues against
organizational separation but calls for clear
conceptual distinctions between research,
risk assessment, and risk management (3).
In the NRC view, research provides the
factual, presumably valueless, basis for risk
assessment. Risk assessment uses scientific
facts to estimate risks, but because the sci-
entific database is incomplete, there are
"decision points where risk can only be
inferred from available data." These deci-
sion points require "scientific judgments
and policy choices" to select among alter-
native inferential bridges. The NRC calls
these choices risk assessment policy. Risk
management integrates the results of risk
assessment with engineering data and
social, economic, and political considera-
tions to weigh policy alternatives and to
Pollicy
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science policy, and policy (fact-value
select an appropriate course ofaction. The
NRC labels these choices risk management
policy.
The NRC suggests, "At least some of
the controversy surrounding regulatory
actions has resulted from the blurring of
the distinction between risk assessment
policy and risk management policy." The
Council notes, however, that the most
important contributor to the conflict and
controversy surrounding regulatory deci-
sions is the differing values placed on the
relative importance of economic costs ver-
sus health benefits by different segments
ofsociety.
Because ofthe contentiousness ofmany
regulatory decisions, the NRC expresses
concern "that scientific interpretations in
risk assessment will be distorted by policy
considerations." Partially in response to
these concerns, the Council recommended
"reorganization to ensure that risk assess-
ments are protected from inappropriate
policy influences and development and use
ofuniform guidelines for carrying out risk
assessments." The NRC made it plain that
"The importance ofdistinguishing between
risk assessment and risk management does
not imply that they should be isolated
from each other; in practice they interact,
and communication in both directions is
desirable and should not be disrupted."
Although the NRC pointed out the
problems associated with organizational
separation and emphasized the need for
communication among researchers, risk
assessors, and risk managers, the 1983
report has served as the rationale to justify
compartmentalization of regulatory deci-
sion making. As summarized in Figure 2,
the NRC made clear conceptual distinc-
tions between research and risk assessment
and between risk assessment and risk man-
agement. Both conceptual and organiza-
tional distinctions among these different
phases are now well-entrenched within
many federal bureaucracies.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of
observers question (or reject outright) this
separation of facts (science) and values
(policy). They argue that, in reality, science
and policy are inseparable, and they find
no rational basis for the existing compart-
mentalization, which they view as artificial,
arbitrary, and counterproductive. These
critics contend that formal integration of
science and policy is necessary to foster bet-
ter and more consensual societal decisions
about environmental health risks (2,7-10).
An alternative to the more traditional
approach (Figure 2) for conceptualizing
the key aspects ofregulatory decision mak-
ing is pictured in Figure 3. In this concep-
tual model, the three phases are not
portrayed as either completely separate or
wholly integrated. Instead, they are pic-
tured as overlapping spheres, each with its
own focus. The role ofvalues, both per-
sonal and societal, is acknowledged and
made explicit within the context of each
sphere. The emphasis shifts from facts to
values as one moves from science to policy
(left to right) along the research-risk
assessment-risk mangagement continuum.
This alternative paradigm explicitly
emphasizes that interrelationships among
scientific research, risk assessment, and risk
management should form a feedback loop
to foster more informed judgments (11,12).
The feedback loop requires that informa-
tion, including facts and values, flow in
two directions. First, the information needs
identified as part of risk assessment and
risk management must drive the direction
and nature ofsupporting research. Second,
the information and understanding gener-
ated by the research program must directly
improve the scientific basis for decisions.
DifferentRolesforSdentists
andRegulators
Science is an integral part of regulatory
decision making and its role is 2-fold: to
improve the quantity and quality of sci-
entific information and to enhance our
ability to interpret the available scientific
database for risk assessment, risk manage-
ment, and risk communication decisions.
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Figure 2. The traditional risk assessment paradigm and its relationship to the fact-value continuum. Adapted from
the National Research Council (3).
Scientists not only conduct research (gen-
erating facts), but many also play a critical
role in science policy (judgments about the
use offacts) by serving as technical consul-
tants, peer reviewers, policy advocates, and
mediators (2).
A major role ofscientists in the regula-
tory process is to provide expert advice
about science policy issues, e.g., validation
oflong-term research strategies, certification
ofstudy protocols and analytical method-
ologies, definition ofstandards ofadequacy
for scientific evidence, and approval of
inferences from studies and experiments
(2). The lack of scientific certainty nor-
mally associated with science policy issues
puts a premium on scientific consensus. In
the face ofsignificant uncertainty regarding
issues such as the adequacy ofscientific evi-
dence and the appropriateness ofinferences
from existing data, consensus among a
diverse spectrum of respected scientists
functions as a stabilizing factor and intel-
lectual anchor; it focuses attention on criti-
cal, unresolved technical questions and
lends credibility to both the process and
its products.
In contrast to the scientist, the regula-
tor must go beyond consideration of the
scientific facts supporting the decision
process. The challenge of regulating risk
involves balancing science, values, and eco-
nomics. Other factors such as legislative
mandates and political considerations can
also play a major role in shaping regulatory
decisions. Six major categories ofinforma-
tion essential to risk managers are (13)
* Science
- public health and ecological risks
- technical feasibility ofrisk manage-
ment options
* Law
- legislative mandates
- regulatory options
* Economics
- costs and benefits
- economic feasibility ofrisk manage-
ment options
* Public Values
- public sensitivity to risk
- credibility ofrisk management
options
* Communication
- public and stakeholder involvement
- communication strategy for risk
management options
* Politics
- political importance ofrisk
- political acceptability ofrisk manage-
ment options.
Ideally, science (along with public val-
ues and economics) is an important factor
in regulatory decision making. When sci-
entific knowledge and understanding are
insufficient to answer important regula-
tory-related questions, there is typically a
controversy about "whether regulators have
the facts right." Moreover, there is typically
widespread concern that without a firm sci-
entific foundation, regulatory decisions can
be more easily driven by political agendas,
media pressure, special interests, legal
challenges, and bureaucratic inertia.
An obvious solution is to invest ade-
quate resources in targeted research and
surveillance to reduce the most critical sci-
entific uncertainties that currently limit
our ability to estimate risks realistically.
Although the roles ofthe scientist and reg-
ulator may be different, it is clear that they
share a common goal-the reduction of
scientific uncertainty to improve the assess-
ment of health and environmental risks
(14-16).
Viewpoints ontheValueofScience
Focusing on the practical realities of real-
world regulatory decisions, divergent view-
points have emerged about the intrinsic
value ofscience in the politically and emo-
tionally charged atmosphere that surrounds
many environmental health issues such as
neighborhood cancer clusters, Alar-conta-
minated apples, and asbestos in schools.
Generally speaking, opinions about the rel-
ative importance of science (e.g., data on
exposure and toxicity) in regulatory deci-
sion making can be grouped into three
broad categories (Figure 4): a) science is a
critical, often central, factor in decisions
(17-20); b) science plays a marginal and
often insignificant role in what are basically
political decisions (2,21-23); and c) sci-
ence is one ofseveral factors in a multifac-
torial decision-making process (8,9,21,24).
The traditional view, consistent with
the risk assessment paradigm (3), has been
that science (research) is an essential dri-
ving force underpinning regulatory
decisions, and that better science (facts)
leads directly to better decisions about
Volume 103, Supplement 6, September 1995 215K. SEXTON
Science Science policy Policy
Facts Judgments Values
Research Riskmasssannt Riskmanagemuat
*Developsfactual basis *Estimatesmagnitude,likelihood, and *Integrates risk assessmentwith
uncertainty ofrsk otherissues
* Explicitly considers personal
andsocietalvalues *Requires scientificjudgments and policy *Determines acceptability ofriskand
choices appropriate responses
eEmphasizesvaluesinselection of
policyoptions
Figure 3. An alternative risk assessment paradigm and its relationship to the fact-value continuum. Adapted from
Sexton etal. (12).
management of risks. Some observers,
however, have taken a more skeptical view,
seeing decisions about risk as essentially a
political (value) exercise wherein science
rarely plays a decisive role. These observers
remind us that science cannot provide
definitive and timely answers to most of
the crucial questions confronting decision
makers, and they argue that science can be
fragmented and polarized by the beliefs
and values ofspecial interests being used to
legitimize political agendas rather than to
illuminate and inform the debate.
A third, more middle-of-the-road view-
point is that science is just one of many
important factors in regulatory decision
making. According to this view, the major
contributions ofscience to decision making
are its unique capabilities to structure and
describe critical technical issues, especially
as they relate to other important decision
variables, and to identify and address key
scientific uncertainties in risk assessment.
Scientists are seen as vested with a special
responsibility to guard against distortions
and misuse of scientific evidence, which
might unfairly bias the process.
Whether science is the central factor or
only a marginal consideration in the final
regulatory decision, it should be an explicit
part ofthe public debate about the serious-
ness and acceptability of environmental
health risks. Scientific evidence can enhance
and inform the debate and lend credibility
to regulatory decisions.
Figure 4. Different viewpoints about the role of
science in regulatory decision making.
FactorsAffectingtheRoleofScience
inRegulatoryDecisions
The role that science plays in regulatory
decision making depends on certain char-
acteristics of the situation. Although this
issue has received little attention, it is evi-
dent that situational variables such as
media scrutiny, public outrage over per-
ceived risks, political pressure to do some-
thing, legal requirements and deadlines,
and the degree of scientific consensus
about risks and remediation measures
affect how and to what extent science
influences decisions. Three of the poten-
tially more significant situational variables
are the age of the relevant public policy
issue, the boundary-crossing implications
ofthe science, and the bureaucratic realities
of real-world pressures and demands on
regulatory decision makers.
Conceptually, publicpolicy issues can be
thought ofas passing through a four-stage
lifecycle: identification, politicalization, leg-
islation, and litigation (Figure 5). Science is
apt to play different roles depending on the
age (life-cyle stage) of the policy issue at
hand. For example, in the identification
stage, science usually provides a sense ofthe
magnitude, scope, and uncertainty of the
problem, while in the litigation stage, sci-
ence primarily documents compliance or
noncompliance with established guidelines,
standards, and regulations.
Another factor oflikely importance is
the potential for science (or scientific con-
sensus) to displace estimates of risk from
one region of social acceptability to
another (Figure 6) (25). Science can be
thought of as having boundary-crossing
implications when it could alter risk esti-
mates in a way that makes them either
more or less acceptable according to
prevailing societal norms. For example,
research might precipitate a change in an
estimated risk such that it moves from
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Figure 5. Simplified life cycle of a public policy issue.
being socially acceptable (e.g., probability
less that one in a million) to being selec-
tively unacceptable (e.g., probability
greater that one in a million), or vice versa.
Science with boundary-crossing implica-
tions is more likely to play a central role in
regulatory decisions and, for that reason, to
be more contentious.
Finally, as a practical matter, regulatory
decision makers respond to the realities
imposed on them by a complex and con-
stantly changing environment (Figure 7A)
(26-29). Among the more important fac-
tors that can affect their decisions are politi-
cal pressures, statutory mandates,
institutional constraints, scientific and tech-
nical issues, public perceptions, and special
interests. The exigencies created by con-
frontations between these often conflicting
forces have fostered an informal decision
process that is, among other things, subjec-
tive, messy, uncertain, unstructured, intu-
itive, pressured, contentious, and chaotic
(Figure 7B).
The people who staff and run this
"adhocracy" tend to exhibit common
bureaucratic tendencies, which can have
significant ramifications for the final out-
come;
* A tendency to make conservative deci-
sions (err on the side ofsafety);
* A reluctance to change (subject to
bureaucratic inertia);
* A tendency to seek/build consensus
(credibility depends on consensus);
* A reliance on codified rules (prefer
standard, published procedures);
* A tendency to delay decisions (don't
decide until forced);
* A dislike ofsurprises (fear that revela-
tions can onlybe bad);
* A tendency to act in self interest (con-
sider impact on career); and
* A response to personalities (prefer
workingwith certain people).
In a recent study (29) of the kinds of
information that U.S. EPA decision mak-
ers want to have when making a decision,
it was found that they wanted data on risk
10-2
Magnitude
of
risk
10-7
Numberof people at risk 0
Figure 6. Conceptual framework for the boundaries between different levels of socially acceptable risk. Adapted
from Kolluru (25).
assessment issues such as numerical esti-
mates of risk, magnitude ofadverse effect,
level of exposure, and confidence in data.
In addition, they also want to have a sense
of the bureaucratic context and possible
institutional ramifications of their actions
(or inactions). For example, they want to
know the consequences ofdoing nothing;
reactions ofstakeholders to recommended
options; costs and economic impacts; what
has been done in previous, similar situa-
tions; and positions of other U.S. EPA
offices and the Office of Management
and Budget.
In the final analysis whether science is a
force or has any effect at all depends to a
large extent on this real-world calculus
involving conflicting forces, informal and
ad hoc decision processes, and bureaucratic
tendencies ofdecision makers. Because the
dynamics ofthese complex interactions are
constantly changing, the role ofscience can
vary dramatically from one situation to the
next. Understanding when and why this is
true is important for identifying ways to
increase the utility of regulatory-related
science in decision making.
The Science and Policy of
Hazardous Air Pollutants:
A Case Study
The hazardous air pollutant provisions of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments offer
an example of how politics can dominate
the debate when there are inadequate facts
about risks and benefits.
A
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Figure 7. Schematic representation of(A)the diversity
of forces affecting regulatory decision makers and (B)
the informal, ad hoc process for making regulatory
decisions.
Practice Realifies ofTidle1II
With relatively little fanfare, the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) were
signed into law by President Bush on
15 November 1990 (30). The passage of
the CAAA by the U.S. Congress involved
intense and protracted negotiation over
complex political issues and ultimately was
dependent on political compromise among
powerful members with diametrically
opposed views, interests, and constituencies
(31,32). The result is a complicated and
detailed piece oflegislation that combines
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traditional approaches such as command-
and-control with some new innovations
like market-based incentives (31-35).
The CAAA provide a comprehensive
regulatory framework for clean air. They
take a primarily prescriptive approach and
mandate an immense, technology-based,
regulatory effort driven by tight deadlines
for compliance. The 1990 regulations cre-
ate new or modified programs to address
acid rain, stratospheric and tropospheric
ozone, vehicle emissions, and hazardous air
pollutants as well as establish a uniform
national permitting system. Eventually the
requirements associated with implementa-
tion ofthe CAAA will affect virtually every
industrial source in the United States and
are expected to fill 6000 pages ofU.S. code
books, compared with 9000 pages for all
other environmental codes combined (34).
Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments addresses the issue of haz-
ardous air pollutants from stationary and
urban area sources. Hazardous air pollu-
tants are those not defined as criteria pollu-
tants under Title I. Among the more
significant provisions ofTitle III are a) a
list of 189 substances (and classes ofsub-
stances) deemed to be hazardous air pollu-
tants; b) requirements to identify and
prioritize major sources ofthese chemicals;
c) a mandate to apply maximum achiev-
able control technology (MACT) to major
sources over the next 10 years; d) spec-
ification that, subsequent to applying
MACT, an analysis ofresidual risk must be
performed to determine if further actions
are needed to protect human health;
e) establishment ofan area source program
aimed at reducing the incidence of cancer
attributable to urban area sources by 75%;
f) formation ofa risk assessment and man-
agement commission composed of 10 sci-
entific experts to examine how risk
assessment and risk management are used to
make decisions about clean air; andg) initi-
ation of a National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) studyon risk assessment (4).
The political decision behind Title III
is apparent: emissions ofhazardous air pol-
lutants pose a threat to public health that is
sufficient to justify the costs ofapplying
MACT. This suppostion is not founded on
hard scientific evidence or rigorous
cost-benefit analysis but rather on a politi-
cal consensus that instead ofwaiting for a
body count, it is prudent public policy to
take regulatory action to reduce postulated,
if highly uncertain, air pollution health
risks. The approach taken in Title III, to
apply MACT and then see ifresidual risks
are unacceptable, reflects congressional frus-
tration with what it perceives to be the slow
pace ofhazardous air pollutant regulation
under the risk-based provisions ofthe 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments; only seven
hazardous air pollutants were regulated
prior to 1990.
In contrast to the political consensus
that hazardous air emissions represent an
unacceptable health risk, the scientific basis
for estimating risks from outdoor exposure
to hazardous air pollutants is fragmented
and sparse. Preliminary estimates by U.S.
EPA suggest that as many as 2500 cancer
cases per year may result from outdoor
exposure to 45 of the 189 hazardous air
pollutants (36), although some researchers
have criticized that estimate as being too
high (37). In addition, it has also been
suggested that noncancer health effects
from outdoor exposure to hazardous air
pollutants, including nonmalignant respi-
ratory disease, hematopoietic abnormali-
ties, neurotoxicity, renal toxicity, and
reproductive and developmental toxicity,
may be widespread. Approximately 50 mil-
lion people live near emission sources
where estimated ambient concentrations of
one or more hazardous air pollutants
exceed levels of concern for noncancer
health effects in humans (38). Overall,
however, a paucity ofdata exists to support
accurate estimates of actual exposures,
doses, and health consequences for either
the general population or for communities
potentially at greater risk.
The available data on the 189 haz-
ardous air pollutants regulated under Title
III are summarized in Figure 8. Based on
an analysis conducted by U.S. EPA (39),
adequate data are currently available on
only a small percentage ofthese chemicals.
For example, fair or better evidence exists
to estimate emissions for only 17 sub-
stances, ambient concentrations for 43,
noncancer health effects for 27, and car-
cinogenicity for 88. Inadequate data are on
hand to estimate emissions for 137 sub-
stances, ambient concentrations for 112,
noncancer effects for 149, and carcino-
genicity for 81 (39).
Given the inadequacy of the scientific
database, the resulting uncertainty about
air pollution health risks, and the enor-
mous costs of implementing the regula-
tions, there has been surprisingly little
criticism of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments in general and ofTitle III in
particular (33,34,40). Currently, both crit-
ics and supporters of the amendments
appear to see them as a significant step
toward achieving the goal of clean air. As
the costs become more apparent, however,
the benefits of the CAAA will come under
increasing scrutiny (41-46).
Insight into the regulators' perspective
on the public health benefits ofthe CAAA
is provided by the following quotes. Lydia
Wegman, Deputy Director, Office ofAir
Quality Planning and Standards, Office of
Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, states that
...The [hazardous air pollutant]
program will substantially decrease
the number of cancer cases caused
by air pollution, and it will reduce
many other health effects.
Consequently, medical costs associ-
ated with these effects will be sub-
stantially diminished (47).
Robert Brenner, Director, Office of
Policy Analysis and Review, Office ofAir
and Radiation, U.S. EPA, said
...I'm confident that the act is
going to be, if not fully imple-
mented, virtually fully imple-
mented....All significant emission
reductions will be attained....55 bil-
lion pounds a year of emission
reductions when the [Clean Air
Act] is fully phased in after the year
2000. That is enough, we believe,
to have a pretty dramatic effect on
people's health (34).
According to Mary D. Nicols, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Air and
Radiation, U.S. EPA,
Today is the third anniversary ofthe
Clean AirActAmendments of 1990.
In the course of those 3 years, the
Act has noticeably improved public
health and the environment (M
Nichols, personal communication).
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Figure 8. Summary of the adequacy of available data
on 189 hazardous air pollutants. Adapted from U.S.
EPA(39).
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Despite the scarcity ofdata, these regu-
latory officials seem confident that
improvements in public health have
occurred already and that they will con-
tinue to acrue in the future from imple-
mentation of the CAAA. Their optimism
appears to be based on the assumption that
a direct relationship exists between regula-
tory actions and related emissions reduc-
tions and between emissions reductions
and reduced health risks (Figure 9). Under
this assumption, keeping score ofthe pub-
lic health benefits is possible by tallying the
number of major regulatory actions taken
(Figure 9B), summing the estimated
reduction in emissions related to these
actions (Figure 9A), and then calculating
the estimated decrease in cancer risk based
on standard EPA approaches (Figure 9C).
This assumption may, however, have no
basis in fact and, without appropriate data,
cannot be verified (4,48,49).
All this suggests that itwould be difficult
to argue that Title III ofthe 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments is science driven. The sci-
entific information and understanding nec-
essary to quantify the risks from outdoor
exposure to hazardous air pollutants with a
reasonable degree ofcertainty are simply
unavailable in most cases. In their absence,
adequate political concern and consensus
among elected officials is sufficient to drive
regulatory action. Although the public
health benefits are uncertain, a political
decision has been made to get on with the
business ofcleaning the air.
Researh inSupportofMoreInformed
andMoreCrdible Decisions
Within this milieu, what is the role of sci-
entific research in Title III? One way to
think about this question is to envision a
continuum of relevant research (Figure
1OA) covering: a) routine testing and moni-
toring to meet statutory requirements;
b) research aimed at reducing uncertainties
in risk assessment; and c) research focusing
on broad strategic issues. Keeping in mind
that these three research directions are not
mutually exclusive, characteristics generally
associated with each are listed in Figure
10B. A combination of all three research
approaches is necessary to establish a firm
and credible foundation for informed deci-
sion making (Figure 10C).
Research to meet key statutory require-
ments is usually the top priority for regula-
tors since theirs is the task ofimplementing
the statutes. Typically, this type ofwork
consists primarily offilling key data gaps
by testing for cancer or noncancer effects
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most cases by two persistent p
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problems contribute to uncertainty in risk
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85%addressed important parameters accurately, in
todate identification of relevant hazards or causal
L pathways, inspecifying the functional form
ofmodels, and in extrapolating from one
set of conditions to another. Research to
address the first problem (lack of data)
emphasizes improvement of the quality
and quantity of the scientific database,
while research to address the second prob-
lem develops and applies mechanistically
based methods and models (12,16).
Research to address strategic issues
examines whether we are asking the right
questions and how science can be more
effective in informing the debate. The
emphasis is on doing the right things and
typically requires a long-term commitment
of resources. This type of research is
important because it can challenge existing
dogma, cause paradigm shifts, and create
the need for new priorities and directions.
In a mature program such as Title III,
late in its lifecycle as a public policy issue
199 1995 (Figure 5) regulatory emphasis is likely to
be on research to meet statutory require-
ments. This may be tempered somewhat
by the fact that Title III also has several
provisions that seem to create an explicit
need for research to reduce risk assessment
uncertainties, including regulatory require-
ments to a) list or delist chemicals (Section
112(b)); b) prioritize source categories
axmour achievablea oltechnologyfor (Section 112(c)); c) delist source categories sourcecategonas (Section 112(c)); d) establish regulations
for modified sources (Section 112(g));
e) implement the urban area source pro-
2000 gram (Section 112(k));f) promulgate stan-
dards to protect public health and the
active onthe 1990 environment (Section 112(f)); and g) pro-
issions reductions mulgate accidental release regulations and
ir; (B) number of guidance (Section 112(r)) (50).
act of technology At this stage, regulatory enthusiasm for
ary sources. (AB) research to address broad, strategic ques- 471. tions appears to be minimal. Given the
political consensus behind passage of the
mating emis- CAAA and the regulators' apparent
nt concentra- confidence that the benefits are worth the
ce. This type costs, and considering inherent bureaucratic
iort duration tendencies toward caution and inertia
things right. (Figure 7), there are few incentives for regu-
reduce uncer- latory officials and policy makers to encour-
bervasive, long age this kind ofresearch. For example, no
knowledged comprehensive research program is in place
;s in this area, to determine whether the list of 189 haz-
reduction or ardous air pollutants in Title III is appro-
speculative. priate or relevant from a public health
is impeded in perspective or to evaluate whether risks
)roblems; lack from outdoor exposure to toxic air pollu-
nding. These
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Figure 10. Conceptual framework for research to strengthen the scientific basis for Title IlIl of the 1990 Clean Air
ActAmendments: (A)directions, (B) characteristics, and (C)framework.
tants justify the costs oftechnology-based
controls.
Research notwithstanding, the philoso-
phy and approach to controlling hazardous
air pollutants embodied in Title III may
remain fixed well into the 21st century. As
the costs ofregulating scientifically uncer-
tain health risks become better defined and
more understood, questions ofwhether we
are doing the right things become pivotal
(41-46). Just because the political issues
seem to be settled does not mean that we
should walk away from the crucial sci-
entific issues. By failing to address the criti-
cal strategic questions now, we ensure that
in the future we will continue to lack a
sufficient scientific foundation for deter-
mining whether we are doing the right
things for the right reasons.
Developments outside or only periph-
erally related to the CAAA, including sci-
entific and technical innovations, new
developments in science-policy judgments,
or changes in policy positions, could
potentially disrupt the existing political
consensus about hazardous air pollutants.
Among the types of changes that might
have significant ramifications for Title III
are the following: the expanding technical
capability and feasibility to measure biolog-
ical markers ofexposure, susceptibility, and
dose in humans; advances in our under-
standing of the etiology of currently ill-
defined and poorly understood chemical
sensitivity syndromes such as multiple
chemical sensitivity, sick building syn-
drome, and building-related illness; break-
throughs in our ability to measure or
estimate the health effects ofchemical mix-
tures; increasing emphasis on risk-based
priority setting (addressing the worst risks
first) to establish budgetary, regulatory,
and research priorities; improvements in
methods and models to determine total
exposures to air pollution, thereby allowing
us to apportion the contribution to expo-
sure ofvarious sources and pathways; and
better information and understanding
about the extent to which economically
disadvantaged communities, including
many ethnic and racial groups, are dispro-
portionately at greater cumulative risk
from air pollution exposures (e.g., issues of
environmentaljustice).
Summary and Conclusions
Facts and values are important building
blocks ofregulatory decisions. Regulatory
decision making incorporates these elements
into an interconnected series ofoverlapping
phases-research (science), risk assessment
(science policy), and risk management (pol-
icy). These three phases should form a feed-
back loop, with risk assessment and risk
management driving research directions and
research providing scientific knowledge and
understanding as the basis for more credible
andinformed decisions.
Views about the utility ofscience in reg-
ulatory decision making cover a wide spec-
trum, from those who see science as central
and decisive to those who believe it is mar-
ginal or insignificant. As a practical matter,
science is one ofseveral variables in a multi-
factorial decision process. Its utility varies
according to certain key situational vari-
ables such as the age ofthe public policy
issue, the boundary-crossing implications of
the science, and the bureaucratic realities of
regulatory decision making.
Environmental Health Perspectives
K SEXTON
B
220SCIENCEANDREGULATORYDECISIONS
The hazardous air pollutant issue pro-
vides an illustration ofpolitical consensus
about the need for regulation despite the
lack ofscientific evidence about risks and
benefits. Hazardous air pollutants are regu-
lated under Title III ofthe 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments in a two-stage process.
First, technology-based standards to limit
emissions are applied to important sources.
Second, residual risk characterization is
conducted after installation of maximum
achievable control technology to determine
whether further emission reductions are
necessary. This regulatory approach is not
based on hard scientific evidence ofhealth
risks or on rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
Instead, the approach is based on a political
decision by Congress that to wait for a
body count before taking action would not
be in the public interest.
Because political consensus, which is
often tenuous, is not necessarily synony-
mous with scientific consensus, research
should not be stymied by the politics of
clean air. In the face ofsignificant uncer-
tainties about the public health benefits of
Title III, a comprehensive research pro-
gram should be undertaken to establish a
solid, credible scientific basis for decision
making. This would necessarily involve a
balanced approach that includes research to
meet statutory deadlines, to reduce uncer-
tainties in risk assessment, and to answer
keystrategic questions.
Because strategic research has the poten-
tial to challenge dogma, shift paradigms,
and reorder priorities, it may not engender
much political and bureaucratic support.
Nevertheless, the need for strategic research
is getting stronger as concerns mount about
the relative costs and benefits ofregulating
uncertain health risks. Informed, cost-effec-
tive protection ofpublic health requires a
blending and balancing offacts and values.
Ifwe are to get the facts right, investing in
sound science is essential.
REFERENCES
1. Brooks H. The scientific advisor. In: Scientists and National
Policy Making (Gilpin R, Wright C, eds). New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964.
2. JasanoffS. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers.
Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1990.
3. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the
Process. Washington:National Academy Press, 1983.
4. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment. Washington:
National Academy Press, 1994.
5. Office ofTechnology Assessment. Health risk research. OTA-
BBS-570. Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office,
1993.
6. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
Improving Risk Communication. Washington:National
Academy Press, 1989.
7. JasanoffS. Bridging the two cultures ofrisk analysis. Risk Anal
13:123-129 (1993).
8. Mayo DG. Sociological versus metascientific views of risk
assessment. In: Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in
Risk Management (Mayo DG, Hollander RD, eds). New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991;249-279.
9. Shrader-Frechette K. Reductionist approaches to risk. In:
Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management
(Mayo DG, Hollander RD, eds). New York:Oxford University
Press, 1991;218-248.
10. Silbergeld EK. Risk assessment and risk management: an
uneasy divorce. In: Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in
Risk Management (Mayo DG, Hollander RD, eds). NewYork:
Oxford University Press, 1991;99-114.
11. Sexton K. The role ofscientific research in risk assessment and
risk management decisions. Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg
106:635-641 (1992).
12. Sexton K, Olden K, Johnson BL. Environmental justice: the
central role ofresearch in establishing a credible scientific foun-
dation for informed decision making. Toxicol Ind Health
9:685-727 (1993).
13. Burke TA. Regulating risk: the challenges ahead. In: Regulating
Risk: The Science and Politics of Risk (Burke TA, Tran NL,
Roemer JS, Henry CJ, eds). Washington:International Life
Sciences Institute, 1993.
14. Graham JD. Resolving the regulatory science dilemma. In:
Harnessing Science for Environmental Regulation (Graham
JD, ed). NewYork:Praeger Publishers, 1991;211-224.
15. Burke TA, Sexton K. Integrating science and policy in a
national human exposure assessment survey. J Int Soc Expo
Anal (in press).
16. Sexton K, Reiter LW, Zenick H. Research to strengthen the
scientific basis for health risk assessment: a survey ofthe context
and rationale for mechanistically based methods and models.
Toxicology (in press).
17. Reilly WK. Aiming before we shoot; the quiet revolution in
environmental policy. Rpt No 20Z-1011. Washington:U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 1990.
18. Graham JD. Science and environmental regulation. In:
Harnessing Science for Environmental Regulation (Graham
JD, ed). NewYork:Praeger Publishers, 1991;1-9.
19. U.S. EPA. Safeguarding the future: credible science, credible
decisions. EPA/600/9-91/050. Washington:U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1992.
20. Browner CM. Protecting the environment: EPA's role (letter).
Science 261:1373 (1993).
21. Crandall RW, Lave LB. Introduction and summary. In: The
Scientific Basis ofHealth and Safety Regulation (Crandall RW,
Lave LB, eds). Washington:The Brookings Institution,
1981;17.
22. Clark WC, Giandomerico G. The critical appraisal ofscientific
inquiries with policy implications. Sci Technol Human Values
10:6-19 (1985).
23. Golay MW. Quality of EPA research (letter). Science.
263:1669-1670 (1994).
24. Ashford NA. Science and values in the regulatory process.
Statistical Science 3:377-383 (1988).
25. Kolluru RV. Risk assessment and management. In:
Environmental Strategies Handbook: A Guide to Effective
Policies and Practices (Kolluru RV, ed). New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1994;327-432.
26. Kimm VJ, Kuzmack AM, Schnare DW. Waterborne carcino-
gens: a regulator's view. In: The Scientific Basis ofHealth and
Safety Regulation (Crandall FW, Lave LB, eds). Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1981;229-249.
27. Landy MK, Roberts MJ, Thomas SR. The Environmental
Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990.
28. Skrzycki C. An 11th-hour call drives EPA bargain with
automakers. Washington Post, 1 February 1994.
29. Bloom DL, Byrme DM, Anderson JM. Communicating Risk
to Senior EPA Policy Makers: A Focus Group Study.
Washington:U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1993.
30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 42 U.S.C. 7401; P.L.
101-549, 15 November 1990.
31. Cohen RE. Washington at Work: Back Rooms and Clean Air.
NewYork:Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992.
Volume 103, Supplement 6, September 1995 221K. SEXTON
32. Bryner GC. Blue Skies, Green Politics: The Clean Air Act of
1990. Washington:Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993.
33. Ruch RB, Howell JS. Proactive industrial strategies for the
clean air act amendments of 1990. J Air Waste Manage Assoc
41:922-927 (1991).
34. McIntosh H. Catching up on the clean air act. Environ Health
Perspect 101:226-229 (1993).
35. Schulze RH. The 20-year history of the evolution ofair pollu-
tion control legistation in the U.S.A. Atmos Environ
27B:15-22 (1993).
36. U.S. EPA. Cancer risk from outdoor exposures to air toxics.
EPA-450/1-90-004A. Washington:U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1990.
37. Gray GM, Graham JD. Risk assessment and clean air policy. J
PolicyAnal Manage 10:286-295 (1991).
38. Hasset-Sipple B and Cote I. Toxic air pollutants and noncancer
health risks. Morb Mortal Wldy Rep 40:278-279 (1990).
39. U.S. EPA. EPA's urban area source research program: prelimi-
nary research report. Washington:U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1994.
40. Wolfe DE, Lamb LM. Clean air act amendments offer substan-
tial savings. The National Environmental Journal
September/October:32-36 (1991).
41. Brookes W. EPA's high cost of political science. Washington
Times, 16 December 1991.
42. Davis B. What price safety? risk analysis measures need for reg-
ulation, but it's not science. Wall Street Journal, 6 August
1992.
43. How a rebellion over environmental rules grew from a patch of
weeds. New YorkTimes, 24 March, 1992.
44. House stalls on EPA status, cites costs. Washington Times, 3
February 1994.
45. Lang RA. National risk assessment policy could aid govern-
ment decision-making. Hazmat World October:71-73 (1993).
46. Meet the Clean Air Act monster. Wall Street Journal, 1
February 1994.
47. Wegman L. Air toxics: the strategy. EPAJ 17:32-33 (1991).
48. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
Human exposure assessment for airborne pollutants; advances
and opportunities. Washington:National Academy Press, 1991.
49. National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences.
Frontiers in assessing human exposures to environmental toxi-
cants. Washington:National Academy Press, 1991;246-249.
50. Hauchman FS. The role of risk assessment in Title III of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. In: Proceedings of the
Conference on Air Toxics Issues in the 1990s: Policies,
Strategies, and Compliance. Pittsburgh, PA:Air and Waste
Management Association, 1991;73-80.
51. U.S. EPA. Strategy for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
(Update 1993). Washington:Office ofAir and Radiation, 1993.
222 Environmental Health Perspectives